Torino14-18 maggio 2012
XI CICLO Seminariale
Thomas Metzinger
Lectio Magistralis: "Spiritualità e onestà intellettuale"17 maggio 2012, ore 18:00
Sala Conferenze della GAM - Galleria d'Arte Moderna
Via Magenta 31 - Torino
Lezioni
- Introduction: The Problem of Consciousness
Readings:
• Metzinger, T. (2010d). Il tunnel dell'io. Scienza della mente e il mito del soggetto. Rom: Raffaello Cortina Editore. Chapter 2.
• Metzinger, T. (1995b). Introduction: The Problem of Consciousness. In Conscious Experience. Thorverton: Imprint Academic & Paderborn: mentis.
• Metzinger, T. (2000d). Introduction: Consciousness Research at the End of the Twentieth Century. In Metzinger 2000b.
• Metzinger, T. (2006y). Generelle Einführung: Die Philosophie des Geistes und das philosophische Problem des Bewusstseins in der zweiten Hälfte des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. In Metzinger22009. Only page 30-32.
• Metzinger, T. (2003a). Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sections 2.4 & 3.2
Tips, Extras, and Options
• Metzinger, T. (2000b). Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Baars, B.J., Banks, W.P. & Newman, J.B. (2003) [eds.]. Essential Sources in the Scientific Study of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
• Banks, W. P. (2009) [ed.]. Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Two-Volume Set, Volume 1–2. San Diego: Academic Press.
• Bayne, T., Cleermans, A. & Wilken, P. (2008) [eds.]. The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Velmans, M. & Schneider, S. (2007) [eds.]. The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Blackwell.
• Zelazo, P.D.,Moscovitch,M. & Thompson, E. (2005) [eds.]. Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
• Metzinger, T. (2003a). Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Section 8.2
• Metzinger, T. (1995d). Faster than thought. Holism, homogeneity and temporal coding. In Metzinger 1995b.
• Metzinger, T. (22009). Grundkurs Philosophie des Geistes. Band 1: Phänomenales Bewusstsein. Paderborn: mentis.
• Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC) <http://theassc.org>
• PhilPapers <http://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-consciousness/>
• Scholarpedia <http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Category:Consciousness>
- What is a Phenomenal Self?
Readings:
• Metzinger, T. (2004c). Précis of „Being No One“. In PSYCHE - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Consciousness, 11 (5), 1-35.
• Metzinger, T. (2003j). Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2, 353-393.
• Metzinger, T. (2010i). The No-Self-Alternative (Chapter 11). In S. Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Seite 279-296.
Tips, Extras, and Options:
• Metzinger, T. (2003f [2004]). Why are identity-disorders interesting for philosophers? In Thomas Schramme and Johannes Thome (Hrsg.), Philosophy and Psychiatry. Berlin: de Gruyter. S. 311-25.
- What is the Minimal Form of Self-Consciousness?
Readings:
• Metzinger, T. (2007j; with B. Lenggenhager, T. Tadi und O. Blanke). Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating bodily self-consciousness. Science, 317, 1096-1099.
• Metzinger, T. (2009f; with O. Blanke). Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(1): 7-13.
• Metzinger, T. (2008a). Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: A brief summary with examples. In Rahul Banerjee and Bikas K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Progress in Brain Research, 168: 215-246. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Tips, Extras, and Options
• Metzinger, T. (2010d). Il tunnel dell'io. Scienza della mente e il mito del soggetto. Rom: Raffaello Cortina Editore. Chapter 3.
• Metzinger, T. (2005c). Out-of-body experiences as the origin of the concept of a "soul". Mind and Matter, 3(1), 57-84.
• Metzinger, T. (2009d). Why are out-of-body experiences interesting for philosophers? The theoretical relevance of OBE research. Cortex, 45, 256-258.
• Metzinger, T. (2007f, with J.M. Windt). The philosophy of dreaming and self-consciousness: What happens to the experiential subject during the dream state? In D. Barrett & P. McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming. Volume 3: Cultural and Theoretical Perspectives. Westport, CT & London: Praeger Imprint/Greenwood Publishers. S. 193-247.
- What is a First-Person Perspective?
Readings:
• Metzinger, T. (2006a). Conscious volition and mental representation: Towards a more fine-grained analysis. In N. Sebanz und W. Prinz (Hrsg.), Disorders of Volition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. S. 19-48.
• Metzinger, T. (2003g, with Vittorio Gallese). The emergence of a shared action ontology: building blocks for a theory. In G. Knoblich, B. Elsner, G. von Aschersleben, und T. Metzinger (eds), Self and Action. Special issue of Consciousness & Cognition (12:4), December 2003, 549-571.
Tips, Extras, and Options
• Metzinger, T. (2010d). Il tunnel dell'io. Scienza della mente e il mito del soggetto. Rom: Raffaello Cortina Editore. Chapter 6.
• Metzinger, T. (2004f). La soggettività dell’esperienza soggettiva: Un’analisi rappresentazionale della prospettiva in prima persona. Networks, 3-4, 1-32.
- The Normative Dimension: From Neuroethics to Consciousness Ethics
Readings:
• Metzinger, T. (2011a; with Elisabeth Hildt). Cognitive Enhancement (Chapter 15). In J. Illes and B.J. Sahakian (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Seite 245-264.
• Metzinger, T. (2006dd). Exposing lies. Scientific American MIND October/November: 32-37.
Tips, Extras, and Options
• Metzinger, T. (2010d). Il tunnel dell'io. Scienza della mente e il mito del soggetto. Rom: Raffaello Cortina Editore. Chapters 8 & 9.