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Embodiment in the Western Tradition.

Almost all the sources of the Western tradition, sometimes combined, sometimes torn asunder, yet always recurring, present the human being as a composite of at least two different, entirely unrelated elements. In the Book of Genesis for example, God forms Adam out of the dust of the Earth, a kind of matter, and breaths life /a kind of soul/ into his nostril. In Plato the immortal soul is kept prisoner in the material body, in Aristotle the form, a spiritual, teleological essence warrants solidity and ipseity to individual substances, thus also to men. Surely, the heterogeneity of the human person is not a philosophical invention, but deeply rooted in archaic human imagination and omnipresent in all cultures. It expresses a primary experience, or rather several primary experiences. First the experiences of anxiety, of insecurity, of stress, second the experience of doing things against our intentions, third the sense of guilt or shame. All these and similar experiences tell us that we are two in one, two persons in one body. If fact it is our body, shape, face, our body alone, which presents us to ourselves and to others as “one”, whereas our experiences present us to ourselves and also to others as two or more in one. Those two or more in one body can form a synthesis with one another yet can also be entangled in constant warfare. Yet the body, although always one, is not indifferent to the split persons or rather powers it carries, for it normally sides with one power against the other. Some of the persons /or powers/united in one body, associate themselves with powers outside the body, like spirits, specters, deities. The outsider associates can be embodied yet also disembodied, invisible. Our body can be in contact with also something disembodied. From this primordial experience a great hope is born, or, in reverse, the hope itself may initiate and reinforce the experience. This hope is vested in a kind of personal life outside the body, one’s own body included, life after death. The feeling or rather the experience that one part of the person is not at all embodied, that it can leave the body and return to it, and that this something is invisible to ourselves and to others gives rise to the conviction, faith or knowledge that this “something”, this disembodied self can communicate with other disembodied selves, stay in their company and remain alive after the decomposition of the dead body. It maybe, or is, immortal, although the body is mortal. Theses common experiences were, traditionally, packaged in shared narratives such as myths and legends. Nowadays, they are rather packaged in narratives about very personal experiences of men and women who were brought back from the so called clinical death. They report of having seen some spiritual thing/ although extended,/ leaving their rigid body. Physiological explanations of the experience do not change the experience. Once Freud said that the unconscious is timeless and this is why we do not believe really in our death, although we know all about it. One could modify his insight and admit, that at the soul, the psyche, whatever it is, or an aspect or “part”: of it is timeless, and this is why Freud is right. We do not believe in our own

death. No more and no less, than our remote ancestors.

This time I do not speculate about collective myths or personal experiences but about their reflection, mirroring or re-telling in Western philosophical imagination. Surely, philosophical imagination is not the prerogative of Western culture. Yet, in this paper I deal solely with the philosophical answers to the experience of embodiment in Western cultures. First because my knowledge does not reach further, yet also for other, more theoretical reasons. These reasons are simple. I am interested in the present crisis of traditional /metaphysical/ philosophy. The reconstruction of some variation of the soul/body theme will be guided by this interest.

I will cover the philosophical understanding of the primordial experiences described above while discussing the vicissitudes of the traditional binary category body/soul, and the Trinitarian category, body,/psyche,/spirit.

Until the Renaissance, or rather until the 17th century, the traditional binary and Trinitarian categories have been frequently modified yet not replaced. In the wake of the victorious march of scientific world explanations, however, two new binary categories, mind/body and thinking/extension did replace their predecessors. This meant not just a change in the vocabulary, as a few post/metaphysicians make us believe, but a radical change of the epistheme or of historical a priori itself, to employ Foucault's terminology. This radical change means, that from this time onwards other and new statements participate in the discourse which can raise a claim to truth. The mind/body question, or the attempt to eliminate this binary category and with it the problem itself once and for all, marks the discourse of the 19th and 20th century. It should, however, not be forgotten, that philosophy is not a strict science, and that it remains possible to operate with the traditional soul/body dualism or psyche, soma, spirit synthesis on a top theoretical level also after the mutation of the historical a priori. Kierkegaard is a case in point.

To express myself primitively: dualism or monism, this is the question. But dualism and /or/ monism not just as far as the controversy concerns the traditional issue of matter and spirit ontologically or epistemologically, yet also as far as the character of the self, of the eventually divided self can be thematized or understood, and in addition also in answering the question as to whether humans live only in one world or in several worlds. It is a paradigmatic question insofar as the different ways to raise it cannot be neatly categorized and put into the boxes of metaphysics or post/metaphysics.

This means, that the usual contemporary habit to find an easy yes and an easy no, will not prove fruitful in this case.

I will proceed quasi genealogically, since I want to detect the great grandfathers and grandmothers of the contemporary debates. Those great grandmothers and grandfathers were unrelated and did not know even about each other, yet we inherited more than genes or rather spiritual genes from all of them. To employ a clever term of Castoriadis, we inherited their imagination and also some of their imaginary institutions, discourses, theories, truths. The different theories, discourses or truths had all their own agendas. In all of them the issues concerning the relation soul/body or soul,/spirit/,body, were addressed, but the telos of the discourses have been different in each and every case. Sometimes the same philosopher will enter different discourses and thus device more

than one model, depending on his actual agenda. .

I will briefly introduce four agendas and characterize each of them with one catchword. 1. The soul in the prison of the body, 2 the body in the prison of the soul, 3 the body as the expression of the soul, 4. pains, pleasures and the matters of the “heart”: My brief demonstration will not even resemble any kind of history of philosophy. I am interested in the dominating imaginary, and not in the sequences of philosophical problem solving.

The soul in the prison of the body.

The metaphor of the soul imprisoned in the body stems, as well known, from Plato. The fantasies, myths linked to the formula are widespread in several Oriental cultures. Yet, this time, in my quasi genealogy of the images in Western modernity, I need to neglect them.

The incarcerated soul is the metaphor of mortality. Unless imprisoned by the mortal body, the soul is free, free floating, immortal. According to Socrates in *Phaedo* the imprisoned soul is sick, because the body makes it sick. Yet when the body dies, the soul is healed. Or in another orchestration: according to Socrates in *Phaedrus*, the divine charioteers do not fall down into mortal bodies, since this fate waits only the human souls whose wings get lost during the fall, although they still preserve the capacity to recollect faintly their divine life before the fall.

There is a seeming contradiction in the story. The Greek Gods were not spiritual creatures, they had a body. They were making love, drinking, eating, they were angry, desiring and so on. Yet they were immortal. It is not the body as such which imprisons the soul but the transient body, the mortal body, the material body. An immortal body is not a prison, precisely because the soul cannot escape from it, does not need to escape from it. The body of the god is at the same time unlike the human body. A god can metamorphose, that is, can appear in entirely different bodies, for example as golden rain or a swan. This means that the divine body is an astral body. A real body, a material body cannot metamorphose. Its sole metamorphosis is the transition from life to corpse. As well known, Plato tried to eliminate the sole obstacle to dealing with the immortal corporeality of gods, by attributing their bad inclinations, desires and deeds to fraudulent human imagination.

The contrast between body and soul is at first temporal. Mortality versus immortality, transient versus perpetuity, destructibility versus indestructibility. Yet the contrast is not just temporal, but also spatial, and finally temporal/spatial. The soul flies upwards to the sky, the body is on the earth, down, the soul falls down. The soul is free unless prisoner of the body. The body is a prison. All these have a major epistemological significance. The body prevents us from knowing the truth, the soul can fly up to the region of the ideas, thus it can at least approximate the knowledge or the vision of the truth. The soul is immaterial. Only the immaterial thing can know the truth.

Here we encounter for the first time the typical metaphysical construction which remains essentially steady during the next two thousand years.

Yet independently from the Greek philosophical tradition Western imagination inherited imaginary institutions from another pair of great grand parents, namely the Bible and the Bible interpretations. Biblical thinking is not of a metaphysical kind, for instead of being presented in logical structures or rational edifices, the thoughts are developed in narratives. YET it is not a mythological kind of thinking either, since the narratives tell representative stories of representative humans. Monotheism excludes the essence of all mythologies: teomachia. Yet the two pair of great grandparents who knew nothing of each other and developed their message in entirely different ways, still shared a combination or rather an interconnection of the three certainties, such as : the One, the Truth, and the Good. Given the different ways of thinking, it was impossible to synthesize them philosophically, yet given their shared certainties ,they could be thought together, in concert, unawares of their differences.

This holds also true about the body/soul duality, yet not necessarily also about their dualism. Duality is about difference, dualism is about hierarchy and more often than not also about

irreconcilability. Duality is detectable almost everywhere in the Biblical narrative, yet dualism only sporadically, in the later books of the canon. Plato, Aristotle or the Stoics mean sometimes duality and sometimes dualism, yet Plato's metaphor about the body as the prison of the soul, presents a very strong case for dualism.

In the first Biblical narrative about day six, God has created the sexless human in his image. Without repeating any of the numberless interpretations of this passage ,one remains certain: it does not allow for the body/soul dualism. In the second Biblical narrative God forms the humans shape, that is the body out of dust, that is matter. Thus the body itself is the unity of matter and form, and a perfect divine work. Only after the matter is formed will God breath life into Adam's nostril. Life as soul is an afterthought after the creation of the body. Since it is divine breath, it is divine or of divine origin, it is the chain that connects man to God, for it is not created by hand but by mouth, the original and originating kiss of life, token of love. The breath is invisible, yet not without extension and certainly not without heat. It is also a kind of matter, an invisible, warm, spiritual matter. This is duality and not dualism. For the shape and the breath are together the human creature, they are bound together, they do not exist without each other, for the soul of every single individual, his or her breath ceases to exist with the demise of the body. Body and soul live together. They can fight /this is duality/ but they cannot exist without one another. Thus the body is not the prison of the soul, but its home. The soul cannot escape the body, since it is life, and there is no other human life than the life of the body. The idea of the immortality of the soul is here irrelevant. Either both- soul and body =are mortal, or both of them are or become immortal. Or death is not the final fate of the human creature, just an interregnum or interval, before the resurrection of the dead. In the later-Messianic- ages and eschatological fantasies God will make the dead resurrect. Not just the ones who died yesterday, but he will gather the dry bones /as Ezekiel and later Daniel prophethized/ and put them together, put flesh on those bones, and thus they will resurrected in their bodies, in their own earthly bodies. This was the "good news" Jesus Christ and his apostles brought into the old worlds of Greek and Roman philosophers.

Who cares for the immortality of the souls, this aristocratic dream anyway? Resurrecting from death in body, in our identity from top to toe, this is the real promise worthy to believe.

Christianity, just like in most other cases, made several attempts to reconcile these two, entirely different, conceptions: the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the ensouled body. They could not abandon any of those two. Not the immortality of the soul because the pagan/Christians were breastfed on this image and hope. Not the resurrection of the dead, for Christ has been resurrected from his death. Moreover, the mere spiritual existence could no more be hailed in contrast to bodily existence, for Christ, the Redeemer, became flesh, he was incarnated spirit, and only as human in flesh in could he redeem those who had faith in him. Early Christians felt uneasy about this very Jewish idea. Some of them suggested, that the body of Christ was not a real body, others, in contrast, that his body really died and his soul flew to his Father. Yet Christian orthodoxy branded both conception heretic. For the suffering of Christ must have been real, not imaginary, because it was through suffering in flesh that He redeemed the human race, and his soul could not abandon his body, since the disciples saw him in his earthly shape as resurrected body. Finally the resurrection of the body, the good news, could not have been sidestepped. Yet it could be interpreted in a sense closer to the Greeks. When apostle Paul discussed the resurrection of the body in his first letter to the Corinthians, he emphasized that there are entirely different kinds of bodies. The resurrected body is not the same body than the corruptible one. It is not a natural body, but a spiritual body. In John's Apocalypse, in contrast, those who are resurrected to live under the Kingdom of Christ for thousand years, will eat and drink, be holy and happy, their body will not be a kind of astral body. Yet the denizens of this pre/Judgment Kingdom will be the just and the faithful ones, those whose soul/body is, or became, clean and guiltless.

The grandchildren of this double ancestral inheritance had to face another challenge. In the Greek/Roman tradition, the immortal was identified with Reason, or rather with "upper Reason" termed in Greek nous, and in Latin intellect. This part of the soul was epistemologically privileged.

For example, the more the soul/Reason liberates itself from the prison of the body, the more perfect knowledge it could attain. The prison or the cave of the body prevents the soul or Reason /in this case the same/ from acquiring perfect knowledge, clear insight into truth, it distorts the images, it produces make/beliefs, falsity, shows an unclean picture, confusion, chaos. Yet in then the Jewish tradition may also enter. For example, there is no reason without a body. Or as Spinoza said, extension and cognition are the two attributes of the same substance. I do not want to complicate matters further. In the very platonic tradition, the thought about the immortality of the soul-Ficino- and even transmigration of the soul into very different bodies, is not necessarily related to the idea of the epistemological privilege of a disembodied self. In Spinoza's case it was the eternal immobility of the universal nature/god substance which made the whole immortality of the soul paradigm irrelevant, yet not the "prison" metaphor in case of single individuals, whereas in Leibniz, for whom all individual substances are alive and death does not exist only transformation the whole prison metaphor sounded nonsense.

We still carry both traditions on our back. I do not have in mind here marginal discourses like theosophy or anthroposophy, neither everyday thinking in the Christian tradition /the souls of the dead meet their Creator/ yet central scientific discourses evolving around the mind/body problem. The issue of "immortality" or "mortality" is replaced by the issue of absence of causality or determination. The question has already bothered Kant /transcendental freedom has no cause, because if it had, we were just marionettes pulled by strings./ The marionette metaphor is in the last instance just a reformulation of the prison metaphor. Briefly: is thought but the function of the brain? If one answers this question in the positive, the final question is still left open: can we understand from a concrete constellation of the brain function what kind of thought has entered our mind just now ? Will we be ever able to answer this question with greater certitude than our ancestors answered their old, yet functionally very equivalent questions two thousand years ago? If every concrete thought as is "caused" by the brain, then the "soul" does not exist, yet the body remains a prison from which there is no escape.

Thus, metaphysics maybe dead, but the issues, the "existential" concerns which were constantly tackled among others also by metaphysics, are not.

The body in the prison of the soul.

The metaphor that our body is imprisoned in our soul is borrowed from Foucault's book "Discipline and Punish", and was meant as a polemical reversal of Plato's well known dictum. Since Foucault, at least in this work, was interested in the social a priori at the time of the birth of modernity, he elaborated, unpacked the meaning of the metaphor with the then emerging "human sciences", their institutionalization and their disciplinary practices. The "soul" which imprisons the body of modern men is produced in the discourse of human sciences. Foucault identifies "soul" not with our immortal spiritual essence, but with Reason, Knowledge, Truth, and all the paraphernalia of the metaphysical tradition/. This is a relevant reversal of the message of Phaedo or of one conception in Phaedrus, yet not of Plato in general, who was not entirely an alien to this very 20 century ideas. There is, however, still a reversal. Plato, and after him the whole metaphysical tradition evaluates. For them, it is right if the body is imprisoned by the soul, since the soul, especially the immortal aspect of the soul /reason, spirituality/ warrants both epistemological and moral truth, whereas the body is the main obstacle in our way to Truth and Goodness /and happiness, of course/. Spirit /Reason/ need to command, the body should obey. Foucault, who does not detect either universal progress or regress in human histories, but mutations, the emergence of ever new mosaics, episteme, does not evaluate. In "History of Sexuality" he admits, that the body has been imprisoned by the soul in several traditions of European culture, yet the question remains, how, to which extend, and by what. He sympathizes with one practice more, than with another and vice versa. To cut a long story short, there is a tremendous difference as to whether one's own soul /reason, will/ regulates and controls one's own body, like in the case of Stoic asceticism, or if a general, impersonal "consciousness", science, that is a

so called objective power/.knowledge produces the truth about one's body and prescribes the ways to regulate

it. In the first case one can create a work of art out of himself. To this question I will soon return.

Whenever the soul is imprisoned in the body, the soul revolts, tries to escape. Whenever the body is imprisoned in the soul, the body revolts, tries to escape. Both constellations were addressed basically by the same thinkers at the same time. In the second figure /body imprisoned by the soul as it should be/ however, the relation immortality/mortality is not at stake, and even the epistemological/moral connotations of the soul/body problem undergo essential alterations.

The Biblical story of the so-called Fall offers a simple cue. It is not Eve's body which makes her disobey the divine command. The serpent talks to her, it talks to her mind. It awakes her doubt but also he curiosity. Doubt and curiosity are mental powers, they "dwell" in the "soul". What does the body do? Hands a fruit to Adam and eats her own. The body obeys the mind, it cannot resist. Then Adam and Eve discover that they are naked. The body is naked. But shame, the knowledge of being naked ,is matter of the soul. The body is, again, in the prison of the soul. No so-called original motivations of the body, such as thirst, hunger or sexual arousal play a part in the story of the Fall. Not even in the story of the first murder. Jealousy is not a corporeal quality.

Thus Biblical /narrative/ thinking testifies from the beginning that the wickedness done by the body is done under the command of thoughts, ideas , reason, soul. The gist of the matter is, however, that only body can inflict violence, and, in the last instance, murder. Soul, thought, reason on its own can exercise power, can humiliate and spiritually also annihilate. Yet it cannot do violence. One can violate only an other person's body, and only body has direct access to body. Beating, wounding, raping, killing, and also imprisoning or sometimes disciplining are acts of bodies exercised on bodies. The body can obey, yet if it does not, it will be violated. Walter Benjamin's concept of divine violence can be conditionally condoned. God does violated men's body /for example during the Deluge/ He did not do it with his own body,/for solely the image of the divine soul was heavy with anthropomorphism/ yet through material disasters, and human bodies. The "first" murder /Cain/ is, however, not a reaction to violence, but violence under mental command. This is called the "first" murder even if it is million times the "first". For the "second" murder can be a "bodily" reaction, given that rage, as an affect, is innate. Biblical/narrative/ thinking, however, does not address philosophical issues as the "parts" or the "functions" of the soul.

Whenever Plato or Aristotle, or most philosophers after them addressed head on the forms of violence, they could not avoid to reach in some ways similar conclusions. Yet since soul, spirituality, Reason were considered immortal and as the very powers that occupy the supreme rank in the human constitution, they had to compartmentalize soul itself. There are different kinds or reason, and different parts of the soul. Only the "highest" soul is epistemologically and morally privileged, but there are also lower parts or capacities of the soul. If the soul initiates wicked acts while imprisoning the body ,it is the lower part or function of the soul alone which can be pinpointed at as the evil counsel.

The bipartite or tripartite model of the soul takes care of the problem. In another metaphor by Platon, the charioteer is Reason, the immortal soul, the privileged knower and moral warranty of truth, yet only one of the "horses" of the soul is obedient, the other is disobedient. Plato does not simply identify the disobedient horse as the agent of carnal desire, for it stand also for the lust for having, acquisitiveness. And even in cases of desire for violence /murder, rape,/ Plato pins the guilt on imagination, fantasy, this very much spiritual and mental faculty. In fact merely bodily lusts are easily satisfied, only the lusts of imagination are insatiable and thus motives for violence

Thus, the body is not imprisoned by the soul, but by one function or one part of the soul. This compartmentalization achieves its most sophisticated form in Kant. The supreme spiritual power, Reason, as practical reason identical with transcendental Freedom, its moral imperative is categorical. Yet not just the body should obey, so should imagination and also all the other cognitive faculties. Kant speaks in length about rational argumentation as morally suspect. Rational argumentation should not replace subjection to the moral law, moreover, no knowledge, not even the knowledge of the good, is allowed to co/determine our pure Will. In addition, not theoretical Reason, but understanding is the warranty of true knowledge, and finally, the immortality of the soul /as soul itself /is just an idea of Reason, we can think it without knowing it.. Once Kant even makes the declaration /in *Metaphysics of Morals*/, that it is indifferent, whether thinking is a function of the matter or the soul.

Yet as Foucault's formula indicates, the issue tackled in the Bible and the metaphysical tradition became more burning then ever. Nowadays more than ever before, theories, ideas, ideologies keep the bodies on strings and make them commit acts of violence, sometimes even without being entirely aware of it, or seeing the consequences. It is still the case, for it cannot be otherwise, that only body violates another body, but the mediations between the bodies are expanding. Even if one has to push just one single button to cause the dead of many thousands, it is still an act performed by the body, although dictated by the mind.

Let me exemplify the new versions of the old story with novels and the experiences of the last century

A . In Balzac's novel, "Father Goriot", the ex/convict and soul snatcher Vautrin put the following question to Rastignac, his intended instrument of crime without punishment: if you knew that pushing a button you would kill a Chinese mandarin whom you have never met and get rich through his death, would you do it? Rastignac shrinks from an analogous . Balzac has foreseen a very modern situation. Roman emperors let gladiators killed by a gesture, that replaced a word. Tyrant generally killed with words such as commands, insinuations, with hiring assassins, with well understandable or ambiguous verbal allusions. The world of Shakespeare is populated by them. But at the end of the chain there is always the body of the murderer, there are hands which strangle a neck or pierce a rapier into a heart, or mix the poison. The murderer normally sees his victim face to face or knows him, whether he is sadistically enjoying the bloody "work" or doing it just for money or in the pursuit of for his cold interest. But what happened in Hiroshima? One gave the go ahead sign, the other pushed a button. They have not seen

the targets. There was murder, but were there murderers? The bodies of the victims were suffering violence through the application of science as technology. Yet, let me repeat, the body has been involved as it also is. Without pushing the bottom there is no death. The “go ahead” does not matter unless there is also execution. The body of the man whose finger pushes the button, is the prisoner of calculation, war machinery, strategies and tactics, he does not simply obey a command, but follows a long, and by him unknown and perhaps hardly understandable chain of reasoning.

.B. In Dostojevsky’s “Crime and Punishment” Raskolnikov kills the old usurer allegedly for her money. As we know he also kills her halfwit sister. At the time of the murder his emaciated body is already imprisoned in the cave of ideology, the combination of rational justification with an alleged holy or praiseworthy goal and calculation. We all know that in this fictitious case this dominating combination ends with disaster. Still, it is a “dominating combination” since the mass murders of the 20- century were normally perpetrated according to this model. Rational calculation as well as rational justification have been dismissed since early modernity as morally problematic guides without an associate such as moral sense, and, even together with their associate like by Kant. Rational calculation together with justification in view of a holy or praiseworthy end, - most often than not-, recommends, condones and even glorifies violence. Violence shines as a universally recommended remedy against real or presumed universal ills. Everyone can be targeted as “usurer” of alike, that is a Jew, as a kulak, as enemy of the people. Carl Schmitt makes a very problematic proposal, for, in my mind, the target is no more a so called “natural enemy” Ideology itself constitutes the enemy, it becomes an artificial ,an ideology/dependent , enemy. In case of a “natural enemy” the enmity is mutual. In the ideologically constituted cases, this is not so. Think of Crime and Punishment. The old woman usurer was not Raskolnikov’s “natural enemy”. And Raskolnikov was not the old woman’s “natural enemy” She became Raskolnikov’s personal enemy, that is the body he targeted for violence, only through and in the wake of his and his age ideological construction. To refer to historical examples, for the Jews Germany was not a “natural enemy”, neither was German nationalism, for the Totzkysts Soviet Communism was not a “natural enemy”. Jews and Trozkyites were singled out and constructed as essential enemies ideologically.

We can think or rather hope that there is a soul that escapes the body altogether, we can also think a body which is not imprisoned, but rather shaped by the soul and simultaneously expresses the soul, makes it manifest. And this suggestion, just like the other two is also a tradition of metaphysics.

3. The body as the expression or manifestation of the soul.

The hylomorphic tradition makes other suggestions. Its model is life as such and all the things alive. The living things have a soul, soul or souls inhabit the cosmos thus the cosmos is not just matter. Decay is temporal and relative, so is decomposition. There is constant generation in corruption. There is no unformed life and the universe bursts of

life, everything is formed.

Here the spatial image of soul/body is reversed.

Soul is not carried inside an otherwise soulless body. The form /the soul is manifest, it is “outside” It is through its own form that the thing becomes what it is. The form carries identity, carries ipseity. The form is the embodiment, it is the “body”, although it is not material, but spiritual.

In the- best known- Aristotelian version of hylomorphism, form as such does not warrant immortality. Only pure form can be immortal or eternal. Nous, as the pure form or Reason, maybe immortal, and the universal pure form, the deity that thinks itself and is not burdened with matter, is eternal. And so is mere matter, chaos, for the cosmos is the forming of chaos. Although form is the embodiment, the singular physical bodies do not achieve nobility solely by this ontological shift, for everything has a perfect form /telos/ and those forms form a hierarchical chain. Thus the free virtuous man/male/ is the form of man. To achieve this perfect form the free man has to mould its matter /”alogen”, emotions, non rational soul/ into the form of virtues up to the point that it will become for him natural, quasi instinctual to practice those virtues. Thus a certain kind of man can form himself as a perfect artwork, yet the virtues, which he should achieve are general, they are given. Contrary to the first two, this is an aristocratic model, for it is only from the ranks of the few that the perfect man can emerge.

Yet, insofar one drops the whole Aristotelian ontology and epistemology, one can easily recognize in this model a simple description of a process which has been conceptualized by mainstream modern sociology and anthropology as “socialization”.

The infant has to “mold” his innate preformed “matter” into the forms of social customs /forms of life/ in order to be able survive in her environment. This is easy for one, difficult for the other, depending on the character, quality and the force of resistance by the preformed innate matter. And it is not just the process of acculturation, yet also every process of learning is still, at least on an elementary level, cognized in the hylomorphic tradition. There are social forms which can mold all the innate matters. For example to learn how to speak a language, how to use objects, how to recognize and follow customs. It is not just by analogy that one speaks of forms of life, meaning in this case forms of human, social life. But not all “matters” can be molded into all kinds of forms. It is normally less problematic if no practice, no askesis, no mental power can make a body perform well in sprinting, ballet dancing or playing violin. Yet the innate material sometimes does not fit into the elementary forms of life. There is a tension and sometimes also a revolt. Without such a tension or revolt, the tension between innate preformed material and the form of life, there would never be a change, moreover there would never be grandeur. Needless to say, not every tension produces change or even less grandeur. Yet there must be was, since not everything can be formed in the optimal way. And this is still hylomorphism of the old Aristotelian, metaphysical brand, but the kind of metaphysics which does not operate with the inside/outside binary opposition, for it aims rather at the elimination of this opposition..

Form, that is telos, spirituality, identity and ipseity /”tode ti”/ is the soul of all the living, yet man is the single living being who can give form to chaos, matter, stuff. The

hylomorphic understanding of works of art is not restricted to the peripatetic school, but became widespread also in the Platonic circles and beyond to the present day/.

Despite Plato's disapproval of writing, the written word, the text has been hailed as the embodiment of thought. Yet the paradigmatic case of the adequate embodiment of thought, spirit, soul, was sculpture. Sculpture is incarnation proper. The body itself beholds the spirit. However, the body is not of flesh and blood, that is, this body is not of corruptible matter, it is formed of marble or bronze, of material which survive humans, generations, centuries, perhaps t/as perennial, time itself In this variant of the soul/body question the internal and external change places, at least seemingly. It is the external, the body which is long lasting, perhaps ever lasting, and in this sense immortal. Yet the reversal or inside/outside relation is deceptive ,since man is "the master of god" as Hegel later puts it in the section of absolute spirit in his Encyclopedia . Hegel/s dictum is ambiguous yet this ambiguity is on purpose because this is how he can cover both horns of the tradition. It is suggested, for example by Plotinos, that the idea of the work, the form itself, is present in the soul of the creator before the creation, and thus the internal soul has the priority .It is the single human's soul, the idea of the soul that manifests itself in the corporeal soul, the form proper. It is also suggested- as Michelangelo's famous poem formulated it -that the idea ,the spirit is 'objective" it dwells in the marble, and that the work of the sculptor is to bring out the form from the marble, briefly, to liberate the soul /idea/ from the prison of mere matter. It is left in darkness, whether the Idea /God/ employs the sculptor as his master builder ,or as to whether the idea in the mind of the sculptor is the demiurge that makes him able to create gods. In the perfect unity of matter and form or of content and form spirit and body merge, became one, there is no more tension, not even motion, the perfect work of art shines in the light of a/ temporality, eternity.

The image of art work as of the finally realized perfect unity of soul and form became problematic in modernity, and seemingly disowned together with metaphysic Yet ,in my mind, only seemingly. It seems to me rather that this tradition became more valued today than we might fathom. To dismiss the soul/form expression does not mean to dismiss the thing itself. What is then Nietzsche's "grand art" than the molding of an entirely new, never ever fathomed idea into a perfect form? I would even dare ,taking the brunt of ridicule from all the Heidegger experts, to read the relation between Earth and World in his "Origin of the Work of Art" as a new and perhaps more sophisticated formula for the matter/soul liaison.

However, the ancient, metaphysical, question of soul/body relation or liaison has disappeared at least after Hegel. And this is essential. The hylomorphic formula becomes just a metaphor. The expression "form" referring to a work of art does not stand for its spirit, soul or the materializations of a divine/human idea, it replaces the term " perfect" or "well done", or "artistic success". And still, there are some contemporary offspring who still resemble their great grandfathers.

First, there is ipseity /tode ti/.Even today, even in times of so called post modernism, a work of art remains itself, it must have an identity, even a mobile has identity, and so does its creator. When one visits a contemporary exhibition she will

immediately recognizes the paintings of the same artist and also that all of them are different. All paintings have an ipseity /one needs to stand for more than a few minutes standing before them to realize this/ and they all carry also the signature of the artists even when they are not signed. Individuality, the unrepeated and unrepeatable individuality, this is and remains the “soul” which appears in the works /call them bodies if you like /and nothing will change this “constellation” unless the end of art which is, despite the popular slogan, not in sight.

Second: the soul , that is the unrepeatable ipseity of the creator and the creature is not equivalent with the idea. Sometimes an artist carries out an idea, and can give a report about it, at least he believes he can ,sometimes he rejects even the idea of an idea. Yet there is rarely a referent, a recognizable referent .In traditional works of art, especially in fine arts,the referent uses to set a limit to the manifestation of the unrepeatable ipseity. Think of a painting on nativity or a still life or a landscape. In fact the absence of referent may make the distinction between matter and form obsolete .The unidentifiable image is taken for granted material thought or intuition. There is no idea carried out, yet the “thing” is “ensouled..

I referred so far to three different discourses /of case 3/. in quasi historical sequences to make the genealogy work The first discourse can be briefly formulated thus: the single soul maybe mortal, yet the single soul created body, the work of art is hopefully immortal. The second discourse can be briefly formulated thus: the subjective or objective ideas which constitute the form can merge and thus embody divine perfection . Third: every creature of art were the signature of the creator, known or unknown, yet every thing has its own soul. It was around the second discourse that the so/called religion of art, that is the worship of the artwork ,and sometimes also the artist, gained prominence.

Healthy spirit dwells in a healthy body, so run the Latin proverb. In both the Stoic and Epicurean tradition which sometimes merged sometimes confronted one another, the hylomorphic conception has been translated into a personal form of life. By the word personal I do not mean, that each person followed its own precept to create a unity of his soul and body but that the general precept that has been as set down in dominant philosophies were sa applicable to single persons as guidelines for their personal a conduct of life. The precepts were thus generally accepted, but the conduct of life was individually formed. The Aristotelian, original model of ethical hylomorphism, where the appropriation of commonly recognized held virtues stood at the center of self/creation, self/formation, has been replaced this time by the program to prepare individual to face all the contingencies of life. No one knows what will happen tomorrow. One can lose one’s wealth, one can also gain wealth, the tyrant can turn against one as he can also decide to heap favors upon one, one can gain distinction and lose honor. Yet the wise man should prepare himself for all these eventualities ,nothing should change his equanimity or s his enjoyment of all pleasure life can offer. The main thing is that one has to take care of himself. Foucault discusses the major “technologies” of the self in several of his writings.

Stoic and Epicurean technologies of the self remain models for a long time,/even for Spinoza and sometimes by Goethe, but the latter leads the story into a new direction, and

he is not alone. He is preceded and joined by the romantics.

I would start with a very simple statement. Kant and a little later Goethe make the interesting remark, that every person over thirty is responsible for his face. Of course, we know the ancient proverb that the face is the mirror of the soul. It tells us that the face of the virtuous expresses goodness and the face of the wicked expresses wickedness. Since the Renaissance time the meaning of the above proverb became broader and also different.. Portrait painting is the case in point. Portrait painters from the high Renaissance onwards ,presented and represented the soul of their models. Not just whether the models soul is virtuous or wicked, yet as the representation of the ipseity of the models. Surely, no portrait stands simply for the face the portrait of whom it is. Not just because a painting is the work of the painter not of the model, thus it is supposed to entail the idea of the painter about the model and not manifest directly the soul of the model. In addition, this was still an age were representation meant more than presentation, it was mean to catch the genus / doge, cardinal, burgher/ together with the singularity of the person. Thus no Renaissance painter would have said that his model and she alone is responsible for her face. But Kant and Goethe did say exactly this. A world was dawning, where everyone was meant to sign the statement that all men and women are born free and equally endowed with conscience and reason .In such a world everyone could be held equally responsible for his or her face by the age of thirty

This simple statement /everyone is responsible for his face at the age of thirty/ is the sign of a new mutation of the hylomorphic discourse. The “soul” becomes identical with personality. And personality identical with the character. And the character is no more typical, it does not represent a socio=cultural group, but is solely singular, individual. This character shines on the face. If everyone is responsible for his face then everyone is responsible for his character. Further on: everyone is the author of his or her character, everyone is the creator of her character. She is a self made man. Not self/made in the vulgar sense, or in a vulgar sense alone, who elevated herself from a humble state to a higher rank or greater riches, but self made as the sole maker of her soul/and form, as the sole maker of her ipseity, In the act of self formation the creator and the creature is one and so is soul and body. The central statement of this discourse is described by Foucault in the following terms: man makes an artwork out of himself. Of course, one is born into a concrete environment, everyone has a different childhood, one has a lucky, the other an unlucky upbringing, one is endowed with certain talents whereas the other is not, one is clever whereas the other is rather dull, one is handsome whereas the other is rather plain. All those “conditions” are regarded as matter, stuff, raw material just like bronze, marble or stone. Yet out of his or her raw material everyone was supposed to shape a perfect statue. As Goethe expressed it ones even the most humble man can become perfect. Or as Nietzsche formulated it, while referring to himself, : one should become what one is. The dominating ethics of modernity, the ethics of personality still composes variations of that theme.

Psychoanalysis can be also interpreted /among others /as an answer to ethics of personality and the self/made/perfect/statue paradigm in general, for it concentrates on the obstacles of this project/ Not on the social obstacles /for these are the still seen as

contingent raw materials from which man can make himself / but on the obstacles which dwell in the body/soul. I repeat, the body and the soul are united here as much as in the "statue" concept. The libido is corporeal and psychical. In Freud's later model of the psyche, the instincts of Eros and Thanatos are both corporeal and psychical. He also combines the third model with model one and two / soul in the prison of the body and the body in the prison of the soul./ He also accepts the traditional differentiation of the soul, associating one part with temporal, the other with the a/temporal, one of which is placed "high up", the other "deep down". As a deeply secular thinker, however, he attributes "eternity" "timelessness" to the "lowest"/ the non/personal Id/, whereas temporality, corruptibility, transiency to the highest /moral super ego, the consciousness of our transiency./ His is a reciprocal model of imprisonment. Through repression the super ego and the ego keep the unconscious psyche/soma captive, yet through traumas, neuroses and madness it is the unconscious/somatic part which will keep the ego and the super/ego in its prison cell. And even if the condition of healing comes from outside, from the science of psychoanalysis and the analyst, healing itself is the fruit of autonomy. Castoriadis is a good interpreter. Freud's ideal is, and remains that of Goethe; the self/made man or woman, whose body and soul merge, and the final product will be the perfect individual character. Like the statue of Moses by Michelangelo.

4. Pains, pleasures, and the matters of the heart.

Adam and Eve sinned /if their disobedience can be called sin/, yet not through their body. They sinned by their "soul", one capacity of the soul: imagination. Eve was curious, she dared to grasp and eat the fruit /a "material" act in itself/ in order to meet the challenge. She took a risk. For their transgression, however, both Adam and Eve were punished on their body. The punishment was bodily /not spiritual/ pain. The pain of childbirth and the pain of hard work. Further on: Eve was also punished by desire: desire for her husband which will make her enslaved to her husband. It might be interesting to discuss why does the Bible mention woman's lust and not of the lust of man. The spiritual punishment which accompanies the bodily pains aggravate them. This is the awareness, the consciousness of death. Are all these pains in vain?

We know about the pains, yet not about pleasures. Contrary to the adventure of the word "Paradise" or "The garden of Eden" the Bible does not speak of the pleasures in Eden. We know that the first man felt solitary before God's second thought in creating a woman as his "helper". But helping in what? We know that they were allowed to eat from every tree of the garden save and all the animals too, yet there is no one word of pleasure. Adam gave names to the animals, but was it pleasure? There is an old debate as to whether the first pair made love in the Garden. The usual answer is yes, since God created two genders not for nothing. Yet there is no one word mentioned about sexual pleasure. Pleasure, just as pain happens outside the Paradise. Or, in one of the Zohar's interpretations: the expulsion from the Paradise stands for the expulsion from the mother's womb.

All the narratives of the Bible /especially of Genesis/ carry a philosophical message

about human condition. It could hardly be maintained that pain precedes pleasure, but it can be said without further explanation that the body is first “thrown” into the prison of the soul. At first the body, and only the body, is used as the means of acculturation. Inflicting pleasure or pain on the body is the first reward or punishment. The awards and punishments inflicted on the body through the bodies of the adults are mediating the soul, that is rationality, customs, and thereby obedience. Since disobedience is the other side of obedience, Adam and Eve expelled themselves from Paradise.

Let me repeat that at the “beginning” the body is thrown in the prison of the a general “soul,” if you wish of an “objective” soul. Only afterwards will some of the innate affects such as fear, shame and the need for a familiar friendly face /elementary love /join the bandwagon. Love as sentiment follows suit.

This fourth story differs in one essential sense from the previous ones, that it offers little or no basis for a conclusive kind of dualism. Different feelings and emotions were usually located at one “part”: of our body. Anger to liver, misanthropy or contemptuousness to bile, love to the heart. Character types were described also by bodily characteristic. In the 19 century for example phrenology became accepted as a kind of science cum art. It has been presupposed that the mere form and the structure of the skull gives reliable information of capacities, contents insight inside the skull. /Hegel made even fun of it in his Phenomenology/

The “raw material” paradigm is still there, yet this stuff is hardly formed, least in a hylomorphic sense. The insight developed in Aristotle’s Rhetoric has never been entirely left behind. It was presupposed that the “raw materials” of all feelings and emotions are innate. All of the philosophers mentioned pleasure and pain, and some of them also desire or simple affects like rage, shame, disgust, joy and sadness. Philosophers agreed also in another major point: cognition and the assessment of the situation is inbuilt in emotions and more complex feelings. They judge the situation. Pleasure felt while meeting an old friend, listening to music, getting an erotic response, having done the right thing are not the same pleasure. The feelings, emotions themselves are different, as also love is different in case one love our child, a beautiful spring day or a satisfying meal. Cognition inbuilt in the feeling, the assessment of situation and its judgment can hardly be called a “form”. It is not a shape, it does not even resemble a body, yet it is not purely spiritual either. Emotions or feelings unite stuff and cognition, and they evaluate, but they cannot be evaluated, at least morally not. The whole philosophical literature, both ancient and modern, circles around two questions. First, whether the emotions are “passions of the soul” or also of the body, and which of them is more liable to the first and which to the second understanding. For example headache is a straightforward bodily pain. But what about the pains felt by a hypochondriac? The desire to pass an exam with flying colors is spiritual, yet what about the heavily beating heart, the sweat? Second, which feeling or emotion is virtuous and which of them are wicked, and which, again is indifferent in this generality and needs to be evaluated only in the situation where they emerge, accounting for their intensity, depth and motivating force? Which of them is active, which reactive? When and where?

It is easy to realize that feelings and emotions are relational, social. Bodily pain is not

relational only if it is inflicted by other human beings, or at least if other human beings could have prevented it or relived it but failed to do so on purpose or by neglect. Briefly, emotions and feelings are intra /human happenings. Pleasure and the pain and as also desire are contact feelings, they are confirming, affirming, vindicating our life, person, deeds, or repealing, denying confirmation, moreover rejecting us, hitting us.

While the metaphor of the body as the prisoner of the soul has been discussed, I tried to show that only bodies can violate other bodies. I added, that although violence is perpetrated by the body it is mostly initiated by the “soul” and that force or constraint or the exercise of power is by no means dependent on bodily transmission. Feelings and emotions as also the absence of them can do more and more lasting harm to the other persons than beating, they can also kill even if no body gets touched. Yet emotions themselves need to be expressed by bodies or quasi bodies to do harm and also to bring blessing. The facial expression shows anger or disgust as also erotic desire. Yet emotions are mostly expressed in words, in speech, in texts, they are thus embodied. These words, speeches and texts can make one devastated or blessedly happy.

Human condition is at first not about autonomy but about dependency. It is not lack of means of survival that makes us most and mostly dependent, but the desire for recognition, for affirmation, for love. We are emotionally dependent beings just as others are emotionally dependent on us. Void of emotional dependency we are lacking in “human substance”- if this expression still makes sense. It made certainly sense in fairy tales told about stone/heart since times immemorial.

Yet emotional dependency in general, and an exclusive bipolar emotional dependency are not the same kind. Exclusive emotional dependency is normally bipolar, that is, it excludes third parties entirely or almost entirely from the emotional chain of reciprocity. It is excessive, In Greek it is /also/ hybris. As it happens in several cases of a hybris, exclusive and bipolar emotional dependency is potentially the greatest blessing and/or the greatest curse in human life.

It is ambivalent, a hybris, even if the dependency is mutual and symmetrical. The first presentation of this kind of mutual dependency is also to be found in the Book of Genesis. The story of Jacob and Rachel, the story of Jacob and Joseph are the tales of symmetric emotional dependency. And yet, the “third parties” jealousy and envy created havoc, guilt on the one hand, and terrible pain about the presumed loss on the other hand. Hybris calls for punishment, this time not from God, who put the things finally right.

But if emotional dependency is not symmetrical, when reciprocity is vanishing, suffering reaches its high pitch and the results maybe devastating. The tragedies of Euripides tell us the several of these stories.

It can be observed how the problem of the body/soul relation is translated into the language of the emotion/reason problematic. One needs to perform some shifts in the precise use of terms if one merges the two questions. I am now no more concerned with the consistency of the traditional arguments, and thus I will avoid to unmask the-sometimes- illicit mergers.

In the model of body/soul hierarchy especially if combined with a hierarchy within the soul /models 1 and 2/, the soul, or the “upper part” of the soul, Reason, is

epistemologically privileged. Since something corporeal, namely the organs of sense, are the sources of sensation, or they at least participate in sensation, knowledge gained by sensation is unreliable, confuse, subjective, “empirical.” It does not warrant truth, certainty. Only those mental entities and procedures, which do not rely on the senses which are not even mixed with sensual experiences are spiritual and thus can grasp truth which is also spiritual. The disembodied self is the privileged “subject” of true knowledge. This is how the concept of “pure” enters the question concerning the sources of knowing. “Pure” means unmixed with anything that has connection with the body. “A priori” knowledge in all its understanding is supposed to be “pure” in the above understanding.

Originally “purity” refers to bodies and mostly to the relations of two or more matters /stuffs/ which should be kept apart, which should not mixed with one another. For example women’s menstrual blood from men’s penis, or certain materials from certain temples, holy places. Submerging into water is mostly the way for purification. In analogy, purity meant also to be innocent from guilt in something. The guilty men was impure, he was sometimes regarded as the source of contamination, who poisons his environment, challenges the gods, causes disaster, has to be eliminated, exiled, even killed, to save the city, the people, the family. Both Greek mythology and the Bible are full with this interpretation of purity and impurity. Although moral “purity” is an analogy, in the original stories the spiritual and the corporeal were not kept apart. Contamination was not just a spiritual, yet also as corporeal matter.

But none of the original versions of purity/impurity distinction had anything to do with the relation between reason and senses. One does not commit crimes or any kind of transgression just with senses or obeying his senses. The truth at stake here is the identification of the source of contamination, and not the “how” of the identification. And this remained so in detection till the present day.

The carrier of the concept of “purity” which starts humble from being unmixed, continues as innocence, to achieve the highest status of epistemological privilege is remarkable. And it is also a long lasting distinction remaining steady from Plato /or perhaps from Parmenides/ at least until Hegel, that is ,during the whole history of metaphysics, and perhaps, beyond. What is of major interest for the question of incarnation, is the transference of the epistemological privilege to the moral privilege. This transference answers the need of metaphysical philosophy . A fully developed metaphysical philosophy is a kind of picture puzzle, where everything must click. First and foremost the speculative and the practical aspect of the philosophy need to click. Since in speculative philosophy pure soul or pure reason became the privileged source and warranty of reaching certainty or truth, the same pure soul or pure reason had to play the role of the sole source of certainty, the warrant of truth in morality as well. This was an easy trick. One had just identify senses /such as seeing, hearing/ with feelings or emotions /such as love, grief, joy, anxiety/ Thus there were “external sensations” and “internal sensations” ,both subjective and thus erratic, and we had to leave both behind to achieve “pure” knowledge and thus be/become/morally “pure”. Instead following our passions we need to conduct our life with the guidance of Reason, as Spinoza put it. Here

an auxiliary construction was needed , covered by the discourse of point 2. Most of the wicked acts have without doubt a mental origin /Kant would say, the reversal of the hierarchy of maxims/

A man in rage can kill dozens, but an idea, a command can murder millions. Since this is common knowledge it could not be simply swept aside even by the most fervent enemies of mere opinions. But a solution presented itself: not reason, rationality without qualification., yet only upper reason, “pure” reason warrants the knowledge of the good and thus true morality. This is a vicious circle : only the kind of reason warrants goodness, which is already constructed as the only source of truth alias goodness. Yet it “clicked” and after all, this was the exigency of the system building.

No one ever experienced the conflict between “pure reason” and “impure” affections or emotions. ”Pure” and “impure” understood in the traditional metaphysical way /including Kant/ are not just characters of the philosophical theater as all the categories, but /at least functionally /simply bad metaphors. But what is ,indeed, constantly experienced and also expressed in artworks and in practical philosophy, is the uncontrollability of certain passions, the addiction to certain emotions. This is by far not always a moral question, and when it is, the morally right is not always on reason’s side, unless we identify reason with purity and goodness, although we have no reason to cling to this tradition. As there is no emotion without cognitive aspect thus there is no cognitive impulse or motivation which would be void of feelings.

Spinoza knew that very well. Otherwise he would not have been able to sum up the greatest wisdom philosophy uttered in this matter so far, that no emotion can be conquered or mastered by anything else but by an opposing and stronger emotion. What is termed “reason” in conflict with other emotions , is sometimes the most useful emotion, sometimes the one which is accepted and also expected by our cultural milieu or by a few others, sometimes the emotion which makes us follow habitual ways of thinking and action, or rather the emotion which signals the danger of addiction by another emotions or the danger that this /other/ emotion will make us doing or suffering something we will later certainly regret. There is no “pure” reason and nothing what we do or desire is entirely without reason. Moral judgment or choice is theoretically not as easy as metaphysical thinking surmised, and perhaps practically not that difficult.

I tried to understand the metaphysical addiction by the metaphor of “purity” It is the desire to make the system click, a desire for completion, perfection and beauty .At this point another desire, need, can also be detected that co/motivates men, and especially philosophers in the same direction. From Aristotle onwards who praised the “autokephalos”, that is the man who is in no need of any other man, till Kant who advised us to dismiss all our feelings and obey the command of pure practical reason /transcendental freedom/ within us alone, perfect autonomy of every single individual human being was hailed as the pinnacle of perfection.

But is it?

I do not want to raise the question whether perfect autonomy can be achieved or not. Most philosophers agree that it can not, and even if yes, we would not know whether it really was. What I want to say is different: perfect individual autonomy would transform

humans into monsters. If it is true, in the sense that is so far an almost common, shared experience, that mutual emotional dependency, /Sartre would say "etre pour l'autrui" / is intrinsic to the human condition, we cannot get rid of this dependency and neither can others rid themselves from the emotional dependency from us. Perhaps, this is easier to understand for women, than of men. Men, especially philosopher/men were supposed to be -if we believe Socrates- pregnant with ideas. If someone is pregnant with ideas, emotional dependency can be dismissed as irrelevant for pure thinking. Yet women who are pregnant with children cannot dismiss emotional dependency, the co/habitation with another life/ as impure or a/philosophical. It must be admitted into "truth".

Emotional dependency is thus intrinsic to the human condition. The desire for autonomy, however, is not to be dismissed. No desire can be dismissed.

Autonomy/heteronomy are bad bipolar oppositions. Not because the good thing is somewhere just in the middle, but because philosophy cannot answer the question "where" this middle is, where the line could be drawn, at which point emotional dependency and autonomy can cohabit, even if not united on a nuptial bed. Neither the "where" and the "how" are answerable in their generality. Only the single individual can give an answer or at least raise the question for herself. And there are no final answers, not even for the single individual, for the question needs to be raised again and again.

I tried to illustrate my conviction that philosophy after the collapse of metaphysical tradition needs to re/think duality. Metaphysics interpreted duality as dualism, yet in the contemporary philosophical discourse, the conceptions of two substances or two unrelated attributes, or the contrast between immortal soul and perishable body, of pure reason and impure capacities of knowledge, can hardly raise the claim even to acceptability. Yet whatever they claimed, metaphysical systems worked on human life experiences, both changing and constant. Philosophers of our age still work on human life experiences. One of those, and not a minor one, is, and remains, duality. Human persons do not experience themselves as a homogeneous self. There are several selves within one person. Moreover, we also live in more than one world, at least two or not more, and it is by far not the same self which is fitted best to live in all of them. As we shut our eyes when listening to music, so we shut down sometimes one function of one of our cognitive capacities, and another time one of our emotional involvements, to be ready to become fully absorbed by a world where those involvements would disturb our sojourn. Yes, we constantly leave a world behind to step into another and a third, and back again, and we know that this is what we are doing and we /normally/ do not mix up one world with another. A five year old in the zoo will not mistake the wolf she observes there for the wolf who has devoured a grandmother and grandchild in Little Red Riding Hood, although while listening to the story, she will keep living in the story and will not think at the wolf in the zoo. How can this be?

Philosophy has always asked childish questions. Let us stay with them.